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Grażyna Skąpska 
Law and Society in a Natural Laboratory: the Case of Poland in 
the Broader Context of East-Central Europe 
 
The new situation in which socio-legal studies currently find themselves in East-Central Europe is 
marked by the necessity to deal not only with the economic, political, cultural, and moral effects of 
the collapse of communism, but also with the planned enlargement of the European Union.1 
It is a situation in which history once more offers a real-life laboratory, where one can again 
test scientific concepts, research tools, and methods and devise new ones to better grasp the newly 
emerging reality. My paper will be devoted mostly to the development of socio-legal studies in 
Poland in the context of new challenges and hopes, against a broader background of similar 
challenges and hopes faced by these studies in other East-Central European countries. 
Although focused on the present, this papers main argument is the importance of the 
historical and cultural factors and intellectual traditions, on the one hand, and the tensions and 
contradictions within a scientific field for the development of socio-legal studies after the 
collapse of communism, on the other. Martin Krygier argues that culture counts and ...our cultural 
context is not only inhabited, but it inhabits, shapes and moulds those brought up in it. ... Ones 
thoughts, values, symbols, are enveloped and to a large extent constituted by the given. (Krygier, 
1999: 88) And quoting another author, Krygier emphasizes ...novelties continually occur, but they 
do so within an already existing idiom of activity(Krygier, after Oakshott, ibidem: 89). 
In light of this argument, independently of the great change, intellectual traditions influence 
socio-legal studies in two ways: either as a source of concepts and role models, or adversarially  
as a negative frame of reference, a warning for future development. 
With regard to the tensions and contradictions characteristic of the scientific field as a 
source of scientific development, I will try to subordinate a description of the development of 
Polish sociology of law to the classical problems of the sociology of science, or, more generally, 
the sociology of knowledge.2 
Following this, I will characterize the socio-legal community, its distinguishing features, as 
well as dominant paradigms but also tensions and contradictions that structure and influence the 
undertaken research. Further, I will venture to describe the changes occurring on the level of 
conceptualization of the studied object. 
Finally, I will try to outline the content of current empirical research and of the more 
theoretical debates after the collapse of communism, in the wake of European Union enlargement 
eastwards. 
Socio-legal studies in the environment of legal pluralism 
Eastern, but above all East-Central Europe has a complex and multifarious legal heritage of 
Roman law, Byzantine law, Muslim law, and local customary law that determined the 
development of legal institutions and cultures, was mirrored in legal mentalities, law perceptions, 
and modes of reasoning, and was an important factor in the application of law. East-Central 
Europe is a place of long public legal history of a struggle for control over political power and 
protection of public rights and for the self-determination rights of nations (Paczolay, 1999). The 
latter were stressed as early as the fifteenth century (by a Polish international lawyer, Paweł 
Włodkowic, professor at the Jagiellonian University). However, it is also a place  at least in some 
parts  where personal freedom was not granted to peasants until as late as the middle of 
nineteenth century. 
Central to Polish history is the special period of the partition of Poland, which resulted in the 
implementation of three different legal cultures on its territory. One of these was the Prussian 
Rechtsstaat culture, the culture of a strong but law-bounded state and of uncorrupted civil service; 
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another was the Austro-Hungarian multicultural society under one legal regime, with broad 
political and intellectual freedoms and liberties and skilled and uncorrupted administration. In the 
part of Poland annexed by Austria-Hungary, Eugen Ehrlich developed the foundations of the 
sociology of law. The third specific legal culture was imposed by Russia, where law was basically 
understood as a kind of disguise for the sheer power of the absolutist monarch, who was in no way 
controlled or subordinated to any higher authority, accompanied by a highly corrupted civil 
service. Some very prominent Russians contrasted this with the right and noble feelings for justice 
of the Russian folk, particularly of peasants.3 The legacy of these three legal cultures still poses an 
interesting and open question about the conceptualization of law and its social functions, promoted 
by Polish sociologists of law.4 
Thus, East-Central Europe is a mosaic of overlapping religious, cultural, and political 
influences, especially the long-lasting effects of the overlapping political orders of the German, the 
Turkish Ottoman, and the Russian Empires, of the Habsburg monarchy, and, after the Nazi 
occupation, of the Soviet system. Here not only can the clash of civilizations be traced; the 
accommodation of various cultural influences is also visible. Apart from that, in some parts of 
East-Central Europe, especially in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, it is argued, interest in law 
and support for the rule of law was limited to social elites and found neither comprehension nor 
support among peasants  the overwhelming majority of the population.5 Therefore, one can 
plausibly argue that, historically in East-Central Europe, the study of cultures and of social 
stratification was an important part of legal studies. Nor have these studies lost their importance in 
the meantime, under conditions created by democratization after the collapse of the dictatorial 
system and by the harmonization of laws as a result of the prospective European Union 
enlargement. The thesis of the complexity of the system of law, and in fact of many overlapping 
systems of law, is formulated with regard to the current situation (Oerkeny and Scheppele, 1999). 
This thesis, based on empirical research, was applied to Hungary, but it can be easily generalized 
to Poland, as indicated by studies on the restitution of nationalized property, and possibly also to 
other East-Central European societies (Skąpska, 2000). 
It is not astonishing that, in the historical context outlined above, famously original society-
oriented legal theories were formulated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 
cultural and legal context produced scholars who won an established place as pioneers of socio-
legal studies. Their theories stressed the complex structure of legal phenomenon, its social and 
socio-psychological embeddedness, and the links between law and other social normative systems, 
above all morality and culture, as represented in customs. Among these pioneers of socio-legal 
studies was Eugen Ehrlich, who was active in a province of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy that 
became part of Romania after World War One. We are indebted to this scholar for ideas on laws 
reality within a context of broader and more deeply binding norms of human associations, based 
on shared understanding or negotiated compromises, as well as for his statements about the 
uncertain and problematic relationship between norms of decision applied by state agencies and 
the patterns of thought and behavior actually existing in society. Another such pioneer was Leon 
Petrażycki, professor of law in Russia and, after the revolution of 1917, sociology professor at 
Warsaw University in Poland, who was concerned with law as a psychological phenomenon 
consisting of associated feelings of rights and duties. Leon Petrażycki also developed a civil 
society-oriented psychological theory of law and morality that stressed the mutual enhancement of 
civic morality and the development of legal institutions. Authors who, like Eugen Ehrlich, were 
also legal practitioners and judges concerned with the local accountability of their verdicts 
underlined the importance of empirical studies on living law or unofficial law and stressed the 
plurality of interlocking orders  or plurality of laws  within a given society, as opposed to legal 
studies focused primarily on legal texts. Such concerns were either functionalistic and pragmatic  
one had to reach a binding decision and implement it in a culturally differentiated social milieu in 
order to maintain the relative coherence of the multicultural monarchy  or more theoretical. In 
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both cases, the society-oriented concepts of law presented a strong foundation of empirical studies 
of living law, laws legitimacy, laws efficiency, and the effectiveness of legal policy. 
Socio-legal scholars as public intellectuals 
Two characteristic features distinguish scholars interested in socio-legal studies in Poland. These 
features seem also to be common, to varying degrees, in other East-Central European countries. 
First, we observe the social and political commitment, the participation in public debates, and the 
fulfillment of civic responsibilities by many prominent scholars of the sociology of law; and 
second, the socio-structural characteristics of socio-legal scholars. 
Sociologists of law, like other professional groups with a predominantly, but not uniquely 
humanistic education and/or a free profession, belonged to a very specific Eastern European 
structural phenomenon, the intelligentsia. To belong to the intelligentsia in Poland and elsewhere 
in this region meant to contribute to the struggle for national independence  and at least for some 
representatives of this social group, also to struggle for a place within Western culture. As the 
distinctive social class, the intelligentsia was seen as having a special mission to watch over the 
souls and spirits of the nations in the name of freedom and justice. Being a part of the overall 
Polish intelligentsia, sociologists of law had a very special status. First, they were and 
predominantly still are lawyers or combine legal and sociological education (Kojder, 1990). Their 
special interest in the social aspects of the functioning of law and the sociological concept of law 
some of them proposed distinguishes them from their professional peers, but also makes them 
defend their views, which are unorthodox from a legal standpoint. They had and have to struggle 
to give the sociology of law a place in the academic curriculum, and to look for support for their 
concepts. This they often find in public debates. 
The specific situation of the intelligentsia generally changed after World War Two, and it is 
changing again now. First, after the Second World War, the social character of the intelligentsia 
changed. Lawyers are a special case here. As a result of their almost complete extermination 
during the Second World War, their further extermination or at least persecution by the new, 
communist authorities, and the strict instrumentalism according to which the law was 
conceptualized as a tool to transform the whole social system into socialism and people into 
socialist citizens, lawyers had to be specially and rapidly educated. Some of them finished only 
special courses, not attending university at all. The state needed lawyers educated in the principles 
of Marxist-Leninist ideology and conforming to the demands of the new economic and political 
order based on a state-owned, planned economy and one-party rule. Moreover, in the Stalinist era, 
i.e., roughly between 1945-1956, it was difficult to even mention the sociology of law, since it 
ceased to exist as an academic discipline and was banned from university curricula, together with 
other disciplines dangerous to Marxist orthodoxy (Kurczewski, 1991). 
However, as I will describe more thoroughly in the following sections of this paper, after the 
thaw of 1956, scholars of the sociology of law could pursue their activities and contribute to the 
stabilization and prestige of the sociology of law in the law community, as well as in the broader 
sociological community, thanks to the underground educational activity of some scholars even 
during Stalinism and thanks to the personal engagement and activity of their students. 
The second characteristic feature of the socio-legal community in Poland is its public 
commitment and public engagement. In the first, inter-war period, in the recent period of the first 
democratic governments and presidency, and in the wake of European Union enlargement, its most 
prominent members were not only engaged in public debates about the development of a 
democratic and liberal society, but have also held high positions in Parliament or the government 
or were active in promoting democratic development and democratic education. This is not to say 
that the entire socio-legal community in Poland was unanimously anticommunist, pro-democratic, 
engaged, and independent-minded. Many examples of political and intellectual opportunism and 
political servility could be cited to the contrary (Podgórecki, 1992). However, precisely from the 
point of view of the development of the discipline, its unorthodox concept of law, and the content 
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of the research carried on, the engagement of some intellectuals has great importance as a source 
of some still valid arguments. 
 The direct roots and models for the contemporary development of Polish sociology of law are 
found in the inter-war period. Thanks to the activities of Leon Petrażycki, the first Chair of 
Sociology was established at Warsaw University (Kojder and Kwaśniewski, 1985; Kojder, 1990). 
The challenge for lawyers in the inter-war period was enormous: they were responsible for the 
development of the basic legal framework of the new state, and they could contribute to the further 
democratic development of their country. In such a vein, Petrażycki was co-author of the final 
draft of the Act of Academic Schools. It sanctioned a high degree of self-administration at 
universities in Poland at the beginning of the 1920s. Leon Petrażycki demonstrated his social 
commitment by the publication in 1920 of his pamphlet How to Rescue Polish Intelligentsia and 
Science as well as by his involvement in promoting the rights of women in public and political 
activities (Skąpska, 1987). 
From the end of the Second World War until 1956, even to teach such subjects as the 
sociology, theory, or philosophy of law required great courage. These subjects were forbidden, 
erased from the syllabi, and, in their place, a simplified version of Marxism-Leninism was taught. 
But even during that darkest Stalinist period, the sociology, theory, and philosophy of law were 
taught unofficially. At the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Jerzy Lande, a disciple of Leon 
Petrażycki, taught the sociology of law at a private, officially forbidden seminar held at home. 
Needless to say, mere participation, not to mention the organization of that seminar, could be 
severely punished as an act of political disobedience. 
The period of the political thaw after 1956 was characterized in Poland by the development 
and academic stabilization of the sociology of law. 
Thanks to Adam Podgórecki, a prominent student of Jerzy Landes private seminar, the first 
Chair for the Sociology of Law was set up at the Institute of Sociology of Warsaw University. In 
1972, Podgórecki established the Institute of Social Prophylactics and Resocialization, also at 
Warsaw University. Owing to his organizational activities and his initiative, the Section of the 
Sociology of Law was organized within the Polish Sociological Association, thus also creating the 
conditions for the non-academic institutionalization of the socio-legal community. Professor 
Podgórecki describes the struggles with governmental authorities and communist party 
functionaries that accompanied his intellectual activity and organizational efforts in his book, 
Polish society (Podgórecki, 1992). 
Another leading Polish sociologist of law and student of Jerzy Landes private seminar, Maria 
Borucka-Arctowa, was strongly and successfully engaged in making the sociology of law an 
obligatory subject of syllabi in legal departments at Polish universities within the framework of a 
legal education reform. 
Recent history has also been marked by the engagement of some of the disciplines prominent 
representatives in the underground activities of the democratic opposition. It was also marked by 
educational engagement in the so-called flying university (a series of fairly regularly held 
underground lectures, conducted in private homes, mostly in Warsaw, that dealt with topics not 
taught officially) and the workers university (also consisting of lectures and seminars, hosted 
mostly on premises of the Catholic Church, mostly, as far as is known, in Kraków and Wrocław). 
This period was also characterized by enormous activity by Polish intellectuals, among them 
sociologists of law, in publishing in the framework of the so-called second circulation  a 
network of underground printing presses and distributors that grew to be more voluminous than 
anything else known in Eastern Europe. This period in the intellectual development of Polish 
sociology of law can also be described as the functioning of an academic discipline in the 
shadows of legality, since the same persons were teaching officially at the state universities and 
unofficially at the flying or workers universities; publishing officially, semi-officially (i.e., in 
books or journals that were printed in editions of only 100 copies, which could be distributed only 
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to a very limited extent), and unofficially; and performing official and unofficial functions (the 
latter as advisors to the democratic opposition). 
The culminating moments of this heroic period in Poland were the Gdańsk Agreement in 1980 
and the Round Table Agreement in 1989. 
In the countries whose economies are liberalizing and whose political systems are 
democratizing after the collapse of totalitarianism, the public engagement of intellectuals, 
sociologists of law among them, was initially greatly applauded. However, after 1989, in these 
same societies interest in socio-legal studies dwindled. Initially, the former original ideas seemed 
no longer compatible with the new realities. No pluralism of legal orders was taken seriously when 
the rule of law was declared in the constitution and, with the prospect of future membership in the 
EU, domestic law had to be subordinated to acquis communautaire anyway. Many scholars once 
engaged in socio-legal studies undertook more practical tasks. But socio-legal studies are currently 
undertaken anew; they focus on the development of post-communist law, on the compatibility of 
legal institutions with the legacy of the former system and with the new challenges, and on the 
importance of extra-legal norms for the functioning of official law. These studies indicate once 
more the public concerns of socio-legal scholars and illustrate the fact that, although the traditional 
role of the intelligentsia is no longer in demand, an empty space has appeared and waits to be 
filled by the learned opinions of publicly engaged intellectuals in order to conduct an informed and 
critical examination of post-communist law and of the processes of legal integration under EU law. 
The unexpected career of functionalism during communism 
Eugen Ehrlich  himself a judge  tried to integrate indigenous law into the concept of law, and 
Leon Petrażycki stressed unofficial law. The dominant paradigms of early socio-legal studies were 
cultural functionalism and psychologism. One has to make binding decisions in a culturally 
differentiated legal environment where the central authorities are far away. Differentiated legal and 
cultural legacies have to be integrated in one coherent legal system of the newly created states, and 
official law has to find sources of legitimacy. 
The later socio-legal studies in Poland were certainly not one-dimensional. On the contrary, 
they were, and still are conflicting, and their sources are many. They can be analyzed in the light 
of a theory stressing the importance of a scientific, critical debate and of theoretical, critical self-
reflectivity. They can be also debated in the light of a theory that investigates the emergence of a 
dominant scientific discourse within a field of a discipline, of a dominant paradigm, and of the 
marginalization of other concepts and theories. 
The first approach underlines the importance of an exchange of arguments that brings about 
the enrichment of theory and research. From this perspective, the first phase in the development of 
the sociology of law in Poland seems to be characteristically effective, influential, and setting a 
model for current research. Works and debates initiated by Leon Petrażycki and his students often 
conflicted with the dominant legal doctrine. Eventually they contributed to the development of 
legal, and not only socio-legal, studies, resulting in the development of a multidimensional concept 
of law in its ontological and methodological version, in the development of the concept of 
conscious legal policy, and in the stress on the motivational and educational functions of law. Both 
versions of the multidimensional concept that law is a complex phenomenon composed  most 
importantly for Leon Petrażycki  of legal norms that are primarily psychological phenomena and 
of official legal texts, and its methodological version that called for the complex methodological 
approach to the analysis of law, the consideration of laws social functioning, its psychological 
aspects, and its doctrinal analysis, proved to be not only useful, but also able to be broadened and 
developed. Similarly, the concept of a rational legal policy and of educational and motivational 
functions of law contributed greatly to the development of the theory of law as a social 
phenomenon. Thanks to Petrażyckis theoretically elaborated idea of conscious legal policy based 
on the concept of the civilizational role of law in the education of citizens and in the development 
of social cooperation, Polish scholars also currently find a sound theoretical basis for their research 
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on the interconnections between the development of law and civil society (Petrażycki, 1985; see 
also Petrażycki, 1959). 
The dark period after the Second World War was characterized by a dramatic closing of 
possibilities of any scholarly debate and by harsh persecution of potential participants in such 
debate. Some of the characteristic questions became the subject of limited and controlled public 
debate after 1956, but especially after 1962, when Adam Podgórecki published his Sociology of 
Law, and after Maria Borucka-Arctowa published her On the Social Operation of Law in 1967. 
Scientific, informed debate suffered another blow after 1968 when, fleeing the politically initiated 
top-down anti-Semitic hysteria, many prominent intellectuals, including sociologists of law and 
lawyers interested in sociological studies on law, left Poland and went to work in Great Britain, the 
USA, and elsewhere. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the new concepts and empirical research on legal phenomena were 
often elaborated against the narrow and primitive concept of legal positivism, proposed mostly by 
politicians and imported together with the foundations of Marxism-Leninism. Within such a 
political context, one may point to several domains of open and often dramatic tensions 
permeating the development of socio-legal debate in Poland, which also have consequences for 
contemporary debates and studies. 
Two clearly contesting positions were elaborated toward law as an object of research. The first 
conformed to the official ideology and to the simplistic, primitive, and often hypocritical version 
of legal positivism promoted by the communist party functionaries. It identified law with an order 
issued by political authority, backed by state force, formulated as legal text, and conforming to the 
basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The content of the latter principles was their current 
interpretation by the top communist party apparatus. The theoretical foundation of this legal 
positivism was Marxism; Marxist theory was envisioned as a part and formative factor of social 
reality. Thus, in this period, the simplified version of legal positivism was accompanied by a very 
anti-positivistic approach to social and political reality. 
Of course, the mechanisms of interconnections between political theory and political reality, 
especially between such a practically oriented theory and political actions, pose one of the most 
interesting theoretical problems. These problems can be approached either by searching for the 
abovementioned idiom of activity, or by looking for holistic, systemic explanations, or both. 
 According to Niklas Luhmann, the holistic semantics offered by Marxist theory presents a 
special case here. Marxism presented itself ...as a unity of science and ideology, a particular kind 
of science. In line with this, it expresses its own theory as a condition of legitimization. 
(Luhmann, 1990: 18) In more simple language, Marxism contributed to the shaping of reality in 
the former communist countries by providing the language and the concepts in which the political 
systems of those countries described and differentiated themselves from their capitalist and 
imperialist environments, in this way legitimizing their own existence. Marxism also provided 
important ideas influencing the frames of minds of these countrys ruling elites and eventually also 
of their citizens. 
 Thus, the self-referential theory provided law with its semantic steering mechanism  an 
Orwellian newspeak  thanks to such concepts as socialist legality, socialist product quality, 
and socialist legal consciousness, which were compatible with the conceptualizations of 
systemic rules known as Diamat (dialectical materialism) or Histmat (historical materialism). 
Marxism provided language and concepts with which the new political system could differentiate 
itself from capitalism without needing empirical evidence of its truths. 
Once applied, the symbolic laws absolved functionaries and citizens even further from 
responsibility for individual actions and their results. It sufficed to apply semantic rituals, to 
proclaim new laws on socialist product quality, to change names and words, and not bother with 
the details of legal acts that would enable the enforcement of the laws on socialist quality or equal 
treatment. It was enough to introduce the rituals of elections and have a symbolic reality 
compatible with theoretical requirements and thus protect the coherence of the system. This idea of 
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a system provided the intellectual and moral context for the social operation of law as a 
subsystem within the socialist society system. In accordance with Marxs thesis about the 
economic base and the intellectual superstructure, but in a much more subtle and profound 
way, the idea of an overarching, all-determining system" supplemented the discourse about law 
with arguments about laws role in the development of the social system. The law was reduced not 
only to a means of oppression one social class uses to its own advantage, as the first naive 
Marxists believed. It was not even perceived as a grand-scale instrument of social change 
anymore, but came to be conceptualized as a coherent system of techniques, including discursive 
techniques, completely desocialized and depersonalized, inevitable, totally subordinated to the 
laws of socialist system development, and therefore beyond any moral judgment. 
On the other hand, when the actual social processes clearly diverged from theory, it was no 
longer possible to hide the uncomfortable facts contradicting ideological/theoretical assumptions 
about the overwhelming presence and development of the socialist system. Then the law acquired 
the purely symbolic quality of a superstructure legitimized by a visionary theory, as part of an 
unquestionable system-related discourse, to which conventional categories of truth did not apply. 
Here we had such examples of systemic hypocrisy as laws stipulating the equal treatment of 
private farmers and national agricultural enterprises or stipulating the protection of small business 
entrepreneurs. Further hypocrisies lay in symbolic laws regarding education for sobriety in a 
country where the statistical data on the consumption of strong alcohol were alarming and nothing 
was undertaken to combat this; in the symbolic law on the socialistic quality of products under 
conditions of universal scarcity, where anything produced was immediately sold; and in symbolic 
anti-pollution laws in the most polluted regions in Europe. 
Niklas Luhmanns neo-functionalist system theory would say that a politically interpreted 
dominant theory, rather than social reality, informed the conformist and even servile legal studies 
of this period. Here, the concept of legal positivism promoted by the proponents of such studies 
means law as existing in legal texts, on the one hand, and its legitimization in a specific theoretical 
reality, i.e., in a reality created within politically interpreted Marxist theory, on the other. 
 This official, doctrinal position was challenged by the very idea of empirical research on the 
social functioning of law. It was contested by the followers of Leon Petrażyckis theory of law, 
first and foremost by Adam Podgórecki. According to Petrażyckis psychological theory of law, 
the law is a realistic phenomenon, composed of a practical judgment, i.e., a judgment assigning a 
pattern of conduct to imperative/attributive emotions. Propositions inherent in such a concept of 
law and linked with the concept of unofficial, intuitive law were reflected in Podgóreckis research 
on the prestige of law, on law and morality, and in studies on legal subcultures, social pathology, 
and social control (Podgórecki, 1966b; 1969; Podgórecki, 1971; Podgórecki, 1975). 
Empirical studies of law were based on the concept of law as a multidimensional phenomenon 
in the methodological sense, proposing a methodologically complex approach to law. They were 
studies on the social functioning of law, attitudes toward law, legal consciousness and social 
change, and social functions of law (Podgórecki, 1969; Podgórecki, 1971; Borucka-Arctowa, 
1964; Borucka-Arctowa, 1974; Borucka-Arctowa, 1981; Skąpska, 1981). 
However, such imminently positivistic components of law (according to definitions from John 
Austin to Max Weber) as its political and social legitimacy, Max Webers theory of law as a 
component of economic development, or Émile Durkheim's concept of strong institutions were 
not broadly debated either in Poland nor, to my knowledge, elsewhere in East-Central Europe until 
the 1980s and 1990s. Another subject characteristically not a topic of discussion and research, a 
subject that would be fully compatible with legal positivism, was the history and traditions of legal 
institutions in the context of modernization processes. One exception was a broad study on divorce 
and changing opinions toward it, conducted by a specialist in private law, Jan Górecki (1967). 
These subjects were of practical interest to authorities, though. In the 1960s and especially in the 
1970s, the political authorities in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe, especially 
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in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the former Soviet Union, became interested in legal efficiency 
and legal consciousness, and they launched large studies on these subjects. 
Controversies and conflicts related to the scope and self-definition of the sociology of law as a 
discipline followed the main controversy on the concept of law as an object of studies. The clearly 
outlined positions consisted in the proposition made by Adam Podgórecki of a broad concept of 
the sociology of law as a theoretical discipline, aimed at constructing a sociological theory of law, 
which was conceptualized as a primarily social phenomenon  as a social construct  supported by 
empirical studies. Such conceptualization of the sociology of law stayed in close connection with 
proposals to study law in a context of broader normative phenomena within a society. The 
opposing view was also formulated, defining the sociology of law as a predominantly empirical 
discipline subordinated to the study of legal doctrine and using sociological methods and 
techniques of empirical research in order to supplement lawyers knowledge of the consequences 
of particular regulations. 
The postulate of conscious legal policy opened the way to further theoretical studies and 
empirical research. It resulted in the concept of socio-technics, as a method of enlightened reform, 
with consideration of psychological, cultural, and macro-systemic factors. Socio-technics was 
defined as a number of general directives telling how, taking into account the existing social 
valuations, to carry out the changes in consciousness in order to attain the socially-intended aims 
(Podgórecki, 1966a: 27). 
The author of this concept also dealt with the problem of the main social values that were the 
basis of the social effectiveness of law, thus formulating the hypothesis of the three modifiers of 
the law operation. The first independent variable was the content that the type of socio-economic 
system gives to legal regulation; the second was the type of subculture existing within a given 
socio-economic system; and the third was the type of personality of the recipient of a given rule 
(Podgórecki, 1966c: 7). 
An example of uneasy relations between the development of socio-legal studies in Poland, the 
public and ethical engagement of their authors, and the political system within which those studies 
were carried out was provided by the methodology of socio-legal research and its theoretical 
foundation within sociological studies of law. Quite strikingly, functionalism provided such a 
theoretical basis and gave studies on law a new theoretical and methodological paradigm, after 
their initial rejection as a bourgeois theory. Afterward, however, it became very fashionable to 
combine functionalism with Marxism, after adapting the positivistic and functionalist concept of 
law as an instrument of social change to functionalistic and systemic premises, with the stress on 
the educational function and effectiveness of law. Adoption of this paradigm roused political 
authorities great interest in research on legal consciousness. 
The positive reception of functionalism after its initial rejection may well be interpreted in the 
light of a political thesis that was especially popular in the propaganda of the 1970s: the thesis of 
the political-moral unity of the developed socialist society. The ontological status of such a 
thesis was very unclear: often it was presented as actual reality in accord with Niklas Luhmanns 
propositions, but because party functionaries also had some doubts, there was a need to support or 
to construct such a unity. Hence stress was put on the abovementioned studies of legal and moral 
consciousness and on the educational function of law. Interest was directed to broad research on 
attitudes toward law, knowledge and opinions about law, and social deviance. But many 
sociologists of law in East-Central Europe, including Poland, used this interest to carry out 
unorthodox and critical research, producing some very interesting material. 
 The tensions that characterize the academic debate may also be analyzed as those that 
structure the scientific field, because of the process of dominance/marginalization within an 
academic community. Such an analysis reveals new features of the production of theoretical 
concepts and of the interpretation of research data: official and unofficial pressures and power 
structures that contribute to the formation of the mainstream discourse and the main paradigms 
within a discipline. Here we can indicate the dominant theoretical and conceptual approaches, 
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dominant discourses, and processes of marginalization of those concepts that do not conform to the 
dominant approach. 
The obvious example of the structuring of the socio-legal research field in conformity with 
power relations determined by ideology is provided by the ideological domination described 
above. The supervision and control of research topics and political censorship within an academic 
community belonged to everyday scientific practice in the 1960s and 1970s, even though Poland, 
along with Hungary, was counted as one of the happier and freer barracks in the socialist camp. 
This was complemented by a degree of opportunism and even intellectual, political, and moral 
cowardice on the part of scientists, which was so interestingly described by Adam Podgórecki 
(Podgórecki, 1992). Even where this debate seemed free, some topics, like the legitimacy of law, 
were simply not discussed. The efforts to debate them were rebuked in Poland by an authoritative 
statement that Polish theory of law has already said everything there is to say on the validity of 
law. 
The field of socio-legal research is also structured by more subtle personal influences on the 
formation of paradigms and discourses and by personal loyalties that influence the development of 
a discipline and which still await proper investigation. 
Considering the still hypothetical importance of such invisible factors in the mainstream 
socio-legal debate and their contribution to the development of mainstream theoretical approaches, 
it is interesting to note that some highly promising concepts were hardly incorporated in socio-
legal debate in Poland and nowadays have been forgotten, for the most part. 
The post-communist societies are confronted with the disappearance of the old system-
thinking and with the emergence of multiple options, though these are fragile, unstable, and 
untried. The response to these options depends greatly on informed, enlightened debate and the 
capability to critically explore their consequences. They struggle with the political heritage and 
ideology of law as an uncontrolled, dictatorial political powers instrument deliberately used to 
transform whole societies and all social systems: economic, political, and cultural (Skąpska, 1994). 
They also look for new paradigms. Nowadays, such paradigms are promised by sociological 
theories on late modernity or post-modernity, theories oriented more toward social agency and 
discourse and that explore more subtle power relations, are influenced by cultural anthropology, or 
are informed by post-structuralist concepts of legal phenomenon that are less rigid, less 
hierarchical, and open to optional interpretations. Important for these studies are new ideas of the 
legal system as being characterized by contingency and growing complexity, with the overlapping 
of many partial and non-hierarchical systems. The Kings Many Bodies proposition (Teubner, 
1997: 763) reflects power decentralization and the overlapping of many heterarchical legal 
systems  national, local, international, and European  in forms of professional self-regulation, 
technical standardization, emerging international labor and corporate law, or the new Law 
Merchant. Apart from that, in the whole region of East-Central Europe, sociologists of law are 
faced with new challenges that result from the stress on strict and efficient legal expertise, the 
dominant economic approaches to law, and the political commitment to goals that do not seem to 
be critically debated. Among them are the transformation of post-communist law in a specific 
process of imitation and mixing and the implementation of acquis communautaire in hasty 
proceedings that often indeed recall the construction of a new Prince Potemkins villages (6).6 
In search of new concepts and methods: socio-legal studies after the collapse of 
communism 
 
The symbolic year 1989 posed a serious challenge to socio-legal studies in Poland and elsewhere 
in East-Central Europe. It happened independently, but also maybe because of the great hopes for 
the rule of law and the revival of interest in the concept of the rule of law that East-Central 
European peaceful revolutions brought about worldwide. This era is commonly understood in 
terms of democracy or the market economy, but is has equally important legal dimensions. It was 
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preceded by growing criticism of the dominant political ideology and the dominant functionalistic 
paradigms, but it succeeded in the astonishing initial revival of legal positivism and the 
simultaneous vanishing interest in studies of the social operation of law. Suffice it to say that the 
sociology of law, once obligatory, is currently an elective subject. The revival of legal positivism 
was accompanied by the seemingly deep and persisting belief in the written law as an instrument 
of social change, i.e., in the new legalism (Sajo, 1994), or new instrumentalism (Skąpska, 
1992; Turska, 1992; Cywiñski, 2000). Such a new and naive legalism was often accompanied by 
the equally naive belief in the efficient implementation of legal institutions (developed in Western 
democracies) in societies experiencing overwhelming social change and dealing with the 
institutional and mental burden of the very recent totalitarian past. In the institutional optimism 
that is a part of naive legalism, Central Europe represents a tabula rasa to be filled by institutions 
and concepts brought in from outside in order to achieve the planned goals of a working 
democracy, an efficient market economy, a robust civil society, and the rule of law. Such 
institutional optimism was based on a crucial proposition, in whose light societies in this region 
are treated as new savages waiting for souvenirs and enlightenment (Sajo, 1997: 44 -49). 
It is not astonishing that socio-legal scholars once again contest the dominant views and 
concepts of law. The arguments of governments, lawyers who work as experts for the government, 
parliamentary commissions, officials responsible for the implementation of acquis 
communautaire, and the more critical sociologists of law determine the current tensions and 
contradictions characteristic of legal studies after 1989. Criticism is predominantly of the 
discrepancy between the statutes and their application and of the still-existing symbolic and 
ritualized attitudes of lawmakers and politicians who still think merely changing statutes or putting 
the democratic legal state in the new constitutions means a shift in reality. The criticism questions 
their optimism, which results from their tacitly assumed sociological theories of social change and 
their still systemic views on law as something imposing itself on society without due 
consideration of mentalities, cultures, and interests. In contrast to this optimistic and simplified 
institutionalism, the more sophisticated, contemporary propositions are based on the assumption 
that there is no simple, linear directionality nor any ultimate goal in change. On the contrary, social 
change is often characterized by discontinuity and often involves crisis; nor is it inevitable or 
irreversible. Accordingly, some maintain that the history of post-communist societies  even if 
they adopt legal institutions promoting liberal constitutionalism, the protection of civil society, and 
the market economy  does not necessarily have a direction, much less a liberal one. All sorts of 
reversals and backlashes are possible, especially if the proponents of institutional reforms do not 
consider the societies hopes and expectations (Alexander and Skąpska, 1994; Skąpska, 1996, in 
the broader context of Szacki, 1994). It is also argued that the naive belief in the law as an 
instrument of social change introduced from above or from outside into an empty space of 
post-communist societies is premature, and that what is going on takes place not on the ruins of 
communism but with the ruins of communism. In this view, the remnants of the former system 
make the important contributions to the emerging new political and economic orders (Stark, 1992). 
Let us glance at the new approaches and new methodology applied in research on unofficial 
law in statu nascendi and the processes of its formation in real life situations. This was the 
character, for instance, of the research on the formation of strictly observed and binding norms 
regulating actions of people queuing for rare commodities  the most frequent daily life situation 
of Poles in the 1980s (Kurczewski, 1985). Important are also studies of conflict resolution, with 
the stress on extra-legal norms influencing the definition of a conflict and its redefinition as a legal 
dispute; extra-legal arguments used in the conciliatory proceedings (Kurczewski , 1982; Borucka-
Arctowa, 1988); and studies on legal and political socialization (Borucka-Arctowa and Kourilsky 
1991). The methodology of these studies was based on in-depth interviews, analyses of 
documents, and participatory observation. 
Within this broad context are some particularly pertinent questions. The first is about the very 
concept of law and the rule of law at the time of democratization; the second concerns the ability 
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of law and legal institutions to deal with transformation, on the one hand, and with the legacies of 
the past, on the other. In this regard, the socio-legal debate in East-Central Europe, including in 
Poland, contributes to the general, worldwide debate on legal institutions in crisis. The starting 
point here is the aforementioned critique of new legalism or new instrumentalism. 
Dysfunctional consequences of such approaches to law were empirically explored and critically 
debated, even before the change, in a book published in Poland in 1988 (Turska and Łojko, 1988). 
Currently, the narrow, technocratic conceptualizations of law are juxtaposed with concepts that are 
relevant for the societies. There are ideas on law once nurtured by members of the democratic 
opposition, images of law characteristic of societies that experience a great transformation not only 
of political and legal systems, but of their life-worlds (Kurczewski, 1993; Priban, 1998). These 
took the form of the propositions of the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka that culture and tradition 
matter for law and put distinctive limitations on public activity, especially if this culture and 
tradition appeals to human rights as a higher law (Havel et al., 1985). Such proposals to involve 
culture and tradition in legal reasoning make us think more about the past, investigate past laws 
and values connected with them, and conduct research on the past verdicts of our supreme courts 
or constitutional tribunals as important limits on the visions of social change. The stress is put on 
the axiological component not only of the concept of the rule of law, but of the very concept of 
law as an important part of social culture (Kojder, 2000). 
In these debates, the characteristic East-Central European ideas on law that were nurtured by 
the first socio-legal scholars return. They link legal studies with the studies on societal moral 
fabric: conceptualizations of rights, human dignity, and justice. However, as is also observed, 
another important feature of modern societies is the impact on lawmaking of lobbying groups, 
NGOs, and spontaneous social movements of civil society. These new developments seem to be 
both inevitable and benign, but the question arises how, after the collapse of communism, the 
social contract will be possible in the face of the pluralism of values and lifestyles and the 
increasing differentiation of collective interests. In light of this, the issue arises of legal certainty 
and legal security as the attributes of the principle of the rule of law, together with the issue of 
stable and reliable foundations for legislation, adjudication, and legitimacy of the democratic state 
ruled by law. In contemporary democracies, such stable foundations of the legal and political 
system are sought in the concept of inalienable human rights and in the principle of human dignity 
that is enshrined in many constitutions, notably in those proclaimed after the collapse of 
totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. This increasingly important approach to law takes inalienable 
human rights as the higher standards for evaluating the functioning of the democratic and the legal 
system, a final test measuring the quality of the democratic and legal order. The relationship 
between democracy and law in modern complex and pluralistic societies is analyzed and evaluated 
in terms of universal standards set off by human rights interpreted and applied in the changing 
social and differentiated cultural conditions of the modern world, quite in accord with the pre-1989 
traditions (Kurczewski, 1993). 
Furthermore, as maintained by socio-legal opponents of the dominant technocratic view of 
law, the increasingly technical character of legal reasoning and of the legal system, the growing 
complexity of democratic institutional arrangements characteristic of contemporary complex 
societies, and the increasing importance of the executive branch of government are challenged by 
the new developments and the emerging new ideas about democracy and law. First, one observes 
the growing importance of judicial review, above all of constitutional review, as controlling not 
only the application of the law in individual cases, but also the conformity of governmental 
decisions and parliamentary legislation with the constitution. Hence the proposal to study the 
interdependence of, and not only the separate processes of lawmaking or law application. Second, 
in accordance with the concepts and theories of Jürgen Habermas, which are very popular in East-
Central Europe, stress is put on contemporary demands to interpret law in terms close to local 
experiences and the equal application of universal legal standards. Within this model, 
proceduralization also means growing stress on the role of constitutional courts and judicial review 
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in general in relation to the political legislative process (Sajo, 1997, idem, 1999). Hence, the 
proposal to investigate the formation of democratic will in the form of a grassroots 
constitutionalism (Skąpska, 1999), to critically review constitutional law and constitutional 
adjudication from the perspective of its compatibility with the conditions of post-communist 
societies under transformation, and to study the formation of constitutional equity. 
Hence the need for studies of institutions, first and foremost of the new, post-communist 
constitutions, to explore the conditions of the adaptation of liberal constitutional principles in the 
given cultural and social context. Kim Lane-Scheppele proposes new approach to 
constitutionalism, the constitutional ethnography based on sociological hermeneutic methods for 
sociologically informed research on post-communist constitutionalism. 
 The model of procedural democracy and of the proceduralization of law leaves some 
questions open. It also indicates the fragility of legal and political systems in modern democratic 
societies. In post-communist democracies, this fragility of the legal and state systems consists in 
the low level of law enforcement, usually analyzed as a consequence of a weak state. So we 
need to study the application and enforcement of the law and the importance of extra-legal, i.e., 
organizational norms that contribute to the efficiency of the application of the law and the impact 
of the mentalities of its main agents  lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and civil servants  on this 
application. These issues are addressed in studies of the application of law in courts and 
governmental agencies and of the corruption of their officials. 
Such studies oppose the dominant view of law as a system that imposes itself on passive 
functionaries. Systemic passivity is replaced by the assumption of pragmatic attitudes of legal 
professionals, public servants, and citizens and by the critical evaluations of individual and 
collective interests, values, and passions. These theoretical postulates consist in replacing the 
ritualistic activities of a systems puppets by real people who promote their own interests. Let us 
think of legal professionals as people who have personalities and characteristic features of courage 
or cowardice or opportunism, are well or not so well trained, more or less intelligent, more or less 
wise, and responsible for their decisions, judgments, and verdicts according to the principles of 
law. Such a theoretical and methodological turn, reflecting the more general pragmatic turn in 
sociological theory, prompts one to investigate the formation and application of law as reflecting 
the cultural, social, and individual properties of laws agents. 
The challenge specific to post-totalitarian socio-legal studies is also connected with the 
procedures of the lustration and decommunization of lawyers, within the more general framework 
of issues of facing the totalitarian past. In this way, very sensitive and sometimes strongly 
contested research on decommunization, lustration, and dealing with the past once more 
contributes to a growing awareness of the importance of applying the law and of basic legal 
principles in this sensitive sphere in which politics and law overlap (Łoś and Zybertowicz, 1999). 
 Next to the political transformation, the crucial change for these societies was brought about 
by the introduction of capitalism and the free market. One speaks here about a civilizing effect of 
law on social and individual activity, of taming anti-social passions, of promoting cooperation, and 
of protecting and promoting interests. In short, the change consists first in the recognition of the 
protective function of law, second, in the recognition of the necessity of legal regulations for 
mutual interactions, and third, in the recognition of the enabling, and not only restraining role of 
law in society and of the fact that sophisticated legal instruments are important for sophisticated 
entrepreneurial, financial, or political activities. Our empirical research already provides us with 
examples of the changing attitudes toward law characteristic of businessmen  a category of 
citizens for whom the importance of law but not necessarily obedience to it is growing (Turska, 
1999; Skąpska, 2002). This change consists in the more pragmatic, down-to-earth, but also more 
demanding attitudes toward legal regulations. The law, especially private law, comes to be treated 
as kind of a toolbox from which one selects an instrument to use as needed, to ones own 
advantage. This change results in growing criticism of symbolic law and legal hypocrisy, 
perceived as violations of the abovementioned protective and enabling functions of law. 
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The most recent phase of development of socio-legal studies in Poland is also characterized by 
growing awareness of deficiencies of the traditional approach, which was based on the criticism of 
legal positivism and official law. This problem is presented in a research program titled What 
Law Do Poles Need? The question was raised whether the broad concept of law can still be 
paradigmatic for socio-legal research conducted in present-day Poland, or whether one should look 
for inspiration to the theory of Max Weber, connecting the development of a formal, rational law 
with the development of the market economy. 
The question is all the more important, the more the development of informal networks, 
contrary to existing official law, and connections based on the do ut des principle are revealed 
by studies of the mechanisms of corruption (Kwasniewski and Kojder, 1979; Kwasniewski and 
Kojder, 1982; Kwasniewski, 1984; Kojder, 1995b), by studies on the impact of collective, vested 
interests on the functioning of the economy, especially the second economy (Łoś, 1989), and 
norms and rules as social capital important for the effective operation of law (Skąpska, 2002). 
Concluding remarks 
The transitional period in the development of socio-legal studies in Poland is certainly not finished 
yet. Conveners of these studies try to analyze the transformation of the political order, of the 
economy, and of the new constitution-formation processes and to define a place for law in the 
specific reconstitution of society after the collapse of communism. In this paper, I have tried to 
show how they respond to new challenges and how the traditional paradigms influence research, 
but also how they change. This report on Polish sociology of law, against the backdrop of the 
development of socio-legal studies elsewhere in East-Central Europe, is certainly not complete. 
Many other important studies have been conducted that were not discussed here, for instance the 
feminist studies of law, the comparative studies of legal and political socialization conducted in 
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, France, Spain, the United States, and Russia, comparative studies of 
the formation of totalitarian law and its importance for the processes of transformation, and studies 
of values in law (Pałecki, ed., 1998). Considering the scope and range of these studies, one hopes 
that the great opportunity offered once more by the natural historical laboratory will enable the 
elaboration of new concepts and new theories of the social operation of law. 
Socio-legal studies already contribute to the new conceptualization of law. In light of their 
results, we can speak of the legal system as a system of legal institutions, norms, and rules that are 
open-ended, polisemic, subject to interpretation, incoherent, and certainly imperfect. Under 
conditions of laws growing complexity and contingency, as well as of growing social and political 
complexity, the actors face an even greater challenge  functionaries of law are no longer 
confronted with authoritative certainties, but with such principles as the margin of free 
interpretation, subsidiarity, the necessity of negotiating the meanings of legal concepts in the 
pluralistic reality of post-totalitarian societies, and the harmonization of laws from the bottom up 
rather than top down, in both the national and the international context. One possible interpretation 
is based on unquestioned relativism, another, more demanding one is commitment to the 
fundamental universal principles of law and justice, valid also in the changing conditions of late 
modernity and more specifically of post-communist reality: the principles that wrongs should be 
righted and crimes punished. 
Therefore, the compatibility of the complex, contingent, and dynamic legal system with the 
complex, contingent, and dynamic society is deeply connected with the initial traditions and 
research methods developed by sociologists of law. Thanks to such traditions, socio-legal scholars 
are prepared for the search for new paradigms. 
                                                          
1  See Kojder and Kwaśniewski (1985), Skapska (1987), Kojder (1990), Kojder (1978). 
2  See Kuhn (1962), Bourdieu (1975). 
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3  Extremely informative and insightful in this respect is the (indirect) controversy between two men, 
representing quintessentially different ideas of law: Leo Tolstoy, not only a prominent writer, but also a 
strong proponent of ideas praising the pure and uncorrupted Russian peasants, for whom the law 
symbolized the cynical justification of sheer and corrupted power, and Leon Petrażycki, a former student 
of law at German universities, proponent of the concept of law as being closely related to the education 
and formation of citizens (for a description of this controversy, see Kojder, 1993). 
4  Apart of the strong solidarity bonds between participants in that forbidden private seminar, one learns 
about criticism leveled at Jerzy Lande by some of his students, when Lande was called to make public 
self-criticism in the presence of his colleagues and students at a meeting held on the Jagiellonian 
University (a public self-accusation combined with a promise of reformation) because of his wrong 
scientific opinions and teaching. 
5  See Pogany A New Constitutional Dis(order) for Eastern Europe in: idem (eds.), 1995: 217 ff. 
6  See the special issue of East European Constitutional Review under the characteristic title The Ordeal 
of EU Enlargement EECR, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall 2000. 
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